Race and the New Reproduction by Roberts, Dorothy E.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 47 | Issue 4 Article 2
1-1996
Race and the New Reproduction
Dorothy E. Roberts
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 Hastings L.J. 935 (1996).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol47/iss4/2
Race and the New Reproduction
by
DOROTHY E. ROBERTS*
Introduction
New means of procreating are heralded by many legal scholars
and social commentators as inherently progressive and liberating. In
this view, in vitro fertilization (IVF), embryo donation, and contract
pregnancy expand the procreative options open to individuals and
therefore enhance human freedom. These innovations give new hope
to infertile couples previously resigned to the painful fate of childless-
ness. In addition, this view holds that the new reproduction creates
novel family arrangements that break the mold of the traditional nu-
clear family. A child may now have five parents: a genetic mother and
father who contribute egg and sperm, a gestational mother who car-
ries the implanted embryo, and a contracting mother and father who
intend to raise the child.' A proponent of new means of reproduction,
John Robertson opens his book Children of Choice by proclaiming
that these "powerful new technologies" free us from the ancient sub-
jugation to "the luck of the natural lottery" and "are challenging basic
notions about procreation, parenthood, family, and children. '2
My impression of these technologies, however, is that they are
more conforming than liberating: they more often reinforce the status
quo than challenge it. True, these technologies often free outsiders
from the constraints of social convention and legal restrictions. They
have helped single heterosexual women, lesbians, and gay men, whom
* Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark. B.A. 1977, Yale College;
J.D. 1980, Harvard Law School. This is a written version of a talk presented at Rutgers
University's Center for the Critical Analysis of Culture and University of California, Has-
tings College of the Law; I am grateful to the participants for their comments. Portions of
this article are adapted from Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. Cm. L. RFv. 209
(1995).
1. See generally John L. Hill, What Does It Mean To Be a "Parent"?: The Claims of
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 355 (1991); Andrea E.
Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96
YALE LU. 187, 192-94 (1986).
2. John Robertson, CHILDREN OF CHoIcE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUC-
TvE TECHNOLOGIES 3 (1995).
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society regards as unqualified to raise children, to circumvent legal
barriers to parenthood.3 Informal surrogacy arrangements between
women, for example, may provide a means of self-help for women
who wish to have children independently of men; moreover, they have
the advantage of requiring no government approval, medical interven-
tion, or even sexual intercourse.4
But these technologies rarely serve to subvert conventional fam-
ily norms. Most often they complete a traditional nuclear family by
providing a married couple with a child.5 Rather than disrupt the ster-
eotypical family, they enable infertile couples to create one. Most
IVF clinics only accept heterosexual married couples as clients,6 and
most physicians have been unwilling to assist in the insemination of
single women.7 The new reproduction's conservative function is often
imposed by courts and legislatures, as well. Laws regulating artificial
insemination contemplate use by a married woman and recognition of
her husband as the child's father,8 and recent state legislation requir-
ing insurance coverage of IVF procedures applies only when a wife's
eggs are fertilized using her husband's sperm.9 On the other hand, as
Martha Field observes, courts have been willing to grant parental
rights to sperm donors "when no other man is playing the role of fa-
ther for the child," such as when the mother is a lesbian or
unmarried. 10
3. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional
Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459,466 (1990); Sharon E. Rush, Breaking with Tradition: Surrogacy
and Gay Fathers, in KINDRED MATTERS: RETHINKING THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FAMILY
102, 132-33 (Diana Tietjens Meyers et al. eds., 1993).
4. Juliette Zipper & Selma Sevenhuijsen, Surrogacy: Feminist Notions of Mother-
hood Reconsidered, in REPRODUCrIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD AND
MEDICINE 118, 137-38 (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1987). Under this arrangement, a fertile
woman would informally promise an infertile woman who wants a child to impregnate
herself with a man's sperm and to give the baby to the infertile woman for adoption.
5. Robertson, supra note 2, at 145 (noting that assisted reproduction furthers the
"primary aim to provide a couple with a child to live and rear in a two-parent family").
6. Thomas A. Shannon, In Vitro Fertilization: Ethical Issues, in EMBRYOS, ETHICS,
AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS: EXPLORING THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 155, 163
(Elaine Hoffman Baruch et al. eds., 1988).
7. Daniel Wikler & Norma J. Wikler, Turkey-baster Babies: The Demedicalization of
Artificial Insemination, 69 MILBANK Q. 5, 13-16 (1991).
8. Bartha M. Knoppers & Sonia LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted Con-
ception: Legal, Ethical and Social Issues, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 329, 332-33, 346-47 (1991);
Lisa C. Ikemoto, Destabilizing Thoughts on Surrogacy Legislation, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 633,
636-37 (1994).
9. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Art. 48a, § 354 DD(3) (West 1995); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 431: 10A-116.5(3) (West 1995).
10. MARTHA FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 116 (1988).
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Feminists have powerfully demonstrated that the new reproduc-
tion enforces traditional patriarchal roles that privilege men's genetic
desires and objectify women's procreative capacity." They make a
convincing case that IVF serves more to help married men produce
genetic offspring than to give women greater reproductive freedom?12
In this essay I will explore how these technologies reflect and rein-
force the racial hierarchy in America. I will focus primarily on in vitro
fertilization because it is the technology least accessible to Black peo-
ple and most advantageous to those concerned about genetic link-
ages. 13 The salient feature of in vitro fertilization that distinguishes it
from other means of assisted reproduction is that it enables an infer-
tile couple to have a child who is genetically-related to the husband. 14
I. The Role of Race in the New Reproduction
A. Racial Disparity in the Use of Reproductive Techmologies
One of the most striking features of the new reproduction is that
it is used almost exclusively by white people. Of course, the busiest
fertility clinics can point to some Black patients; but they stand out as
rare exceptions.' 5 Only about one-third of all couples experiencing
infertility seek medical treatment at all; and only 10 to 15 percent of
infertile couples use advanced techniques like IVF.16 Blacks make up
a disproportionate number of infertile people avoiding reproductive
technologies.
When I was recently transfixed by media coverage of battles over
adopted children, "surrogacy" contracts, and frozen embryos, a friend
11. See, ag., Janice G. Raymond, WOMEN AS WOMBs: REPRODUCrIVE TECHNOLO-
GIES AND THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN'S FREEDOM (1993); Barbara Katz Rothman, RECRE-
ATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (1989);
REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECrIVES (Joan C. Callahan ed.,
1995).
12. See, e.g., Susan Sherwin, No LONGER PATIENT:. FEMINIST ETHIcs AND HEALTH
CARE 127 (1992).
13. I capitalize the "B" in Black Americans because I believe that Black Americans
consider themselves to be an ethnic group, like Asian-Americans, whereas I believe that
white Americans do not see themselves in that way.
14. As I explain below, many women who could conceive through artificial insemina-
tion prefer the more expensive and risky IVF because it can produce a baby with a genetic
link to their husband. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
15. See Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL.
L.REv. 623, 646 (1991); F.P. Haseltine et al., Psychological Interviews in Screening Couples
Undergoing In Vitro Fertilization, 442 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCL 504, 507 (1985); Martha
Southgate, Coping with Infertility, ESSENCE, Sept. 1994, at 28, 28.
16. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL
CHOICES (OTA-BA-358) 7, 49-60 (1988).
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questioned my interest in the new methods of reproduction. "Why
are you always so fascinated by those stories?," he asked. "They have
nothing to do with Black people.' 7 Think about the images con-
nected with reproduction-assisting technologies: They are almost al-
ways of white people. And the baby in these stories often has blond
hair and blue eyes-as if to emphasize her racial purity. A "Dona-
hue" show featured the family of the first public surrogacy adoption.
Their lawyer Noel Keane describes the baby, Elizabeth Anne, as
"blonde-haired, blue-eyed, and as real as a baby's yell."'18 He con-
cludes, "The show was one of Donahue's highest-rated ever and the
audience came down firmly on the side of what Debbie, Sue, and
George had done to bring Elizabeth Anne into the world."' 9
In January, 1996, the New York Times launched a prominent
four-article series entitled The Fertility Market, and the front page
photograph displayed the director of a fertility clinic surrounded by
seven white children conceived there while the continuing page fea-
tured a set of beaming IVF triplets, also white.20
When we do read news accounts involving Black children created
by these technologies they are always sensational stories intended to
evoke revulsion at the technologies' potential for harm. In 1990, a
white woman brought a lawsuit against a fertility clinic which she
claimed had mistakenly inseminated her with a Black man's sperm,
rather than her husband's, resulting in the birth of a Black child.2'
Two reporters covering the story speculated that "[i]f the suit goes to
trial, a jury could be faced with the difficult task of deciding the dam-
ages involved in raising an interracial child."'22 Although receiving the
wrong gametes was an injury in itself, the fact that the gametes were
of the wrong race added a unique dimension of harm to the error.
In a similar, but more bizarre, incident in the Netherlands in
1995, a woman who gave birth to twin boys as a result of IVF realized
when the babies were two months old that one was white and one was
17. I first recounted this story in Roberts, supra note *, at 209.
18. Noel P. Keane & Dennis L. Breo, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 96 (1981).
19. Id.
20. Trip Gabriel, High-Tech Pregnancies Test Hope's Limit, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 7, 1996,
at 1, 10.
21. Robin Schatz, "Sperm Mixup" Spurs Debate: Questioning Safeguards, Regula-
tions, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Mar. 11, 1990, at 3; Ronald Sullivan, Mother Accuses Sperm Bank of
a Mixup, N.Y TNins, Mar. 9, 1990, at B1.
22. Barbara Kantrowitz & David A. Kaplan, Not the Right Father, NEWSWEEK, Mar.
19, 1990, at 50, 50.
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Black.23 A Newsweek article subtitled "A Fertility Clinic's Startling
Error" reported that "while one boy was as blond as his parents, the
other's skin was darkening and his brown hair was fuzzy."' 4
It is easy to conclude that the stories displaying blond-haired
blue-eyed babies born to white parents are designed to portray the
positive potential of the new reproduction, while the stories involving
the mixed-race children reveal its potential horror.
These images and the predominant use of IVF by white couples
indisputably reveal that race in some way helps to shape both the use
and popularity of IVF in America. What are the reasons underlying
this connection between race and the new reproduction?
First, the racial disparity in new reproduction has nothing to do
with rates of infertility. Married Black women have an infertility rate
one and one-half times higher than that of married white women.25 In
fact, the profile of people most likely to use IVF is precisely the oppo-
site of those most likely to be infertile. The people in the United
States most likely to be infertile are older, poorer, Black and poorly
educated.26 Most couples who use IVF services are white, highly edu-
cated, and affluent.2 7
Besides, the new reproduction has far more to do with enabling
people (mostly men) to have children who are genetically related to
them than with helping infertile people to have children.28 The well-
known "surrogacy" cases such as Baby M and Anna J. involved fertile
white men with infertile wives who hired gestational mothers in order
to pass on their own genes. Moreover, at least half of women who
undergo IVF are themselves fertile, although their husbands are not.29
These women could conceive a child far more safely and inexpensively
by using artificial insemination although the child would not be genet-
23. Dorinda Elliott & Friso Endt, Twins-With Two Fathers; The Netherlands: A Fer-
tility Clinic's Startling Error, NEwsWEEK, July 3, 1995, at 38, 38.
24. Id.
25. Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson & Elaine J. Hall, Reproductive Technology: Perspectives
and Implications for Low-Income Women and Women of Color, in HEALrNG TEcHNoL-
oGY: FEMmNS PFRsPECrvEs 93, 108 (Kathryn Strother Ratcliff et al. eds., 1989).
26. Sevgi 0. Aral & Willard Cates, Jr., The Increasing Concern With Infertility: Why
Now?, 250 JAMA 2327, 2327 (1983).
27. Andrews & Douglass, supra note 15, at 646.
28. Joan C. Callahan, Introduction to REPRODUCTON, ETmIcs AND T=s LAW: FEMI-
NIsT PERSPECrIVES, supra note 11, at 24-25.
29. Raymond, supra note 11, at 6; Judith Lorber, Choice, Gift, or Patriarchal Bar-
gain?: Women's Consent to In Vitro Fertilization in Male Infertility, in FEMiMST PERSPEC-
TrEs IN MEDICAL ET-cs 169, 171 (Helen Bequaert Holmes & Laura M. Purdy eds.,
1992).
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ically-related to the husband. Underlying their use of IVF, then, is
often their husbands' insistence on having a genetic inheritance. In
short, use of reproduction-assisting technologies does not depend
strictly on the physical incapacity to produce a child.
Instead, the reason for the racial disparity in fertility treatment
appears to be a complex interplay of financial barriers, cultural prefer-
ences, and more deliberate professional manipulation. The high cost
of the IVF procedure places it out of reach of most Black people
whose average median income falls far below that of whites. The me-
dian cost of one procedure is about $8,000; and, due to low success
rates, many patients try several times before having a baby or giving
up.30 Most medical insurance plans do not cover IVF, nor is it in-
cluded in Medicaid benefits.31 IVF requires not only huge sums of
money, but also a privileged lifestyle that permits devotion to the ar-
duous process of daily drug injections, ultrasound examinations and
blood tests, egg extraction, travel to an IVF clinic, and often multiple
attempts-a luxury that few Black people enjoy. As Dr. O'Delle
Owens, a Black fertility specialist in Cincinnati explained, "'For White
couples, infertility is often the first roadblock they've faced-while
Blacks are distracted by such primary roadblocks as food, shelter and
clothing."' 32 Black people's lack of access to fertility services is also
an extension of their more general marginalization from the health
care system.
There is evidence that some physicians and fertility clinics may
deliberately steer Black patients away from reproductive technolo-
gies. For example, doctors are more likely to diagnose white profes-
sional women with infertility problems such as endometriosis that can
be treated with in vitro fertilization. 33 In 1976, one doctor found that
over 20 percent of his Black patients who had been diagnosed as hav-
ing pelvic inflammatory disease, often treated with sterilization, actu-
ally suffered from endometriosis. 34
30. Gabriel, supra note 20, at 10-11.
31. Annetta Miller et al., Baby Makers Inc., NEWSWEEK, June 29, 1992, at 38, 38;
Gabriel, supra note 20, at 10; George J. Annas, Fairy Tales Surrogate Mothers Tell, 16 L.
ED. HEALTH CARE 27, 28 (1988). Only 10 states require insurance coverage of IVF.
Gabriel, supra note 20, at 10.
32. Monique Bums, A Sexual Time Bomb: The Declining Fertility Rate of the Black
Middle Class, EBONY, May 1995, at 74, 76.
33. Lisa C. Ikemoto, Destabilizing Thoughts on Surrogacy Legislation, 28 U.S.F. L.
REv. 633, 639 (1994).
34. Donald L. Chatman, Endometriosis in the Black Woman, 125 AM. J. OBSTERlCS
& GYNECOLOGY 987, 987 (1976).
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Screening criteria not based specifically on race tend to exclude
Black women, as well. Most Black children in America today are
born to single mothers, so a rule requiring clients to be married would
work disproportionately against Black women desiring to become
mothers. One IVF clinic addresses the high cost of treatment by of-
fering a donor oocyte program that waives the IVF fee for patients
willing to share half of their eggs with another woman.35 The egg re-
cipient in the program also pays less by forgoing the $2000 to $3000
cost for an oocyte donor.3 6 I cannot imagine that this program would
help many Black patients, since it is unlikely that the predominantly
white clientele would be interested in donations of their eggs.
The racial disparity in the use of reproductive technologies may
be partially self-imposed. The myth that Black people are overly fer-
tile may make infertility especially embarrassing for Black couples.3 7
One Black woman who eventually sought IVF treatment explained,
"Being African-American, I felt that we're a fruitful people and it was
shameful to have this problem. That made it even harder. '38 Blacks
may find it more emotionally difficult to discuss their problem with a
physician, especially considering the paucity of Black specialists in this
field. Blacks may also harbor a well-founded distrust of technological
interference with their bodies and genetic material at the hands of
white physicians.
Finally, Blacks may have an aversion to the genetic marketing
aspect of the new reproduction. Black folks are skeptical about any
obsession with genes. They know that their genes are considered un-
desirable and that this alleged genetic inferiority has been used for
centuries to justify their exclusion from the economic, political and
social mainstream. Only last year Richard Herrnstein & Charles Mur-
ray's The Bell Curve was a national bestseller, and it reopened the
public debate about racial differences in intelligence and the role ge-
netics should play in social policy.3 9
Blacks have understandably resisted defining personal identity in
biological terms. Blacks by and large are more interested in escaping
the constraints of racist ideology by defining themselves apart from
inherited traits. They tend to see group membership as a political and
35. COOPER CENTER FOR IWF, Cooper Center for IVF Responds to the Fertility Mar-
ket, N.Y. TImsS, Jan. 14, 1996, at 16 (advertisement).
36. Id.
37. Martha Southgate, Coping with Infertility, ESSENCE, Sept. 1994, at 28, 28.
38. Id.
39. See Richard J. Herrnstein & Charles Murray, Tim BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE
AND CLAss STRucTuRE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994).
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cultural affiliation. Their family ties have traditionally reached be-
yond the bounds of the nuclear family to include extended kin and
non-kin relationships.
My experience has been that fertility services simply are not a
subject of conversation in Black circles, even among middle-class pro-
fessionals. While I have recently noticed stories about infertility ap-
pearing in magazines with a Black middle-class readership such as
Ebony and Essence, these articles conclude by suggesting that child-
less Black couples seriously consider adoption.40 Black professional
women I know are far more concerned about the assault that recent
welfare reform efforts are inflicting on our poorer sisters' right to bear
children-an assault that devalues all Black women and children in
America. 41
Moreover, Black women are also more concerned about the
higher rates of sterilization in our community, a disparity that cuts
across economic and educational lines. One study found that 9.7 per-
cent of college-educated Black women had been sterilized, compared
to 5.6 percent of college-educated white women.42 The frequency of
sterilization increased among poor and uneducated Black women.
Among women without a high school diploma, 31.6 percent of Black
women and 14.5 percent of white women had been sterilized.43
B. The Importance of the Genetic Tie
Race also influences the importance we place on IVF's central
aim-having genetically-related children.
Of course sharing a genetic tie with children is important to peo-
ple of different races and in racially homogeneous cultures. Most par-
ents I know take great satisfaction in having children who "take after
them." It seems almost natural for people to want to pass down their
genes to their children, as if they achieve a form of immortality by
continuing their "blood line" into future generations.
Yet we also know that the desire to have genetically-related chil-
dren is influenced, if not created, by our culture. A number of femi-
nists have advocated abandoning the genetic model of parenthood
because of its origins in patriarchy and its "preoccupation with male
40. See, e.g., Bums, supra note 32, at 148; Southgate, supra note 37, at 28.
41. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE
L.J. 1563, 1582 (1996) (book review).
42. LEVIN & TAUB, Reproductive Rights, in WOMEN AND THE LAW sec. 10A.07[3][b],
1OA-28 (C. Lefcourt ed., 1989).
43. Id.
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seed." 44 We should add to these concerns the tremendous impact that
the inheritability of race has had on the meaning of the genetic tie in
American culture.
The social and legal meaning of the genetic tie helped to maintain
a racial caste system that preserved white supremacy through a rule of
racial purity.45 The contradiction of slavery existing in a republic
founded on a radical commitment to liberty required a theory of racial
hierarchy. Whites took the hereditary trait of race and endowed it
with the concept of racial superiority and inferiority;46 they main-
tained a clear demarcation between Black slaves and white masters by
a violently enforced legal system of racial classification and sexual
taboos.47
The genetic tie to a slave mother not only made the child a slave
and subject to white domination; it also passed down a whole set of
inferior traits. Children born to a slave, but fathered by the white
master, automatically became slaves, not members of the master's
family. To this day, one's social status in America is determined by
the presence or absence of a genetic tie to a Black parent. Con-
versely, the white genetic tie-if free from any trace of blackness-is
an extremely valuable attribute entitling a child to a privileged status,
what Cheryl Harris calls the "property interest in whiteness. ' 48
For several centuries a paramount objective of American law and
social convention was keeping the white bloodline free from Black
contamination. It was only in 1967 that the United States Supreme
Court in Loving v. Virginia49 ruled antimiscegenation laws unconstitu-
tional. Thus, ensuring genetic relatedness is important for many rea-
sons, but, in America, one of those reasons has been to preserve white
racial purity.
44. Joan C. Callahan, Introduction to REPRODUCroN, ETmcs, AM TH LAW: FEMI-
NmT PERSPEcrrvEs, supra note 11, at 1, 11. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 11, at 39; Chris-
tine Overall, ETIcs A HumAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 149 (1987)
(noting that "the need for a genetic connection with one's offspring seems to be of particu-
lar importance to men").
45. Roberts, supra note *, at 223-30.
46. See Stephen Jay Gould, THE MismEAsupFn OF MAN (1981).
47. Barbara K. Kopytoff & A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racial Purity and Interracial
Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEORGETOWN LU. 1967, 1967-68
(1989).
48. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1707, 1713 (1993).
49. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
April 1996] RACE AND THE NEW REPRODUCTON
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
C. Value of Technologically Created Children
Finally, the new reproduction graphically reflects and reinforces
the disparate values placed on members of social groups.
The monumental effort, expense and technological invention that
goes into the new reproduction marks the children produced as espe-
cially valuable. It proclaims the unmistakable message that white chil-
dren are precious enough to devote billions of dollars towards their
creation. Black children, on the other hand, are the primary object of
welfare reform measures designed to discourage poor women from
procreating.
11. Implications for Policy Regarding the New Reproduction
What does it mean that we live in a country in which white wo-
men disproportionately use expensive technologies to enable them to
bear children, while Black women disproportionately undergo surgery
that prevents them from being able to bear any? Surely this contra-
diction must play a critical part in our deliberations about the morality
of these technologies. What exactly does race mean for our own un-
derstanding of the new reproduction?
Let us consider three possible responses. First, we might ac-
knowledge that race influences the use of reproductive technologies,
but decide this does not justify interfering with individuals' liberty to
use them. Second, we could work to ensure greater access to these
technologies by lowering costs or including IVF in insurance plans.
Finally, we might determine that these technologies are harmful and
that their use should therefore be discouraged.
A. The Liberal Response: Setting Aside Social Justice
The liberal response to this racial disparity is that it stems from
the economic and social structure, not from individuals' use of repro-
ductive technologies. Protection of individuals' procreative liberty
should prohibit government intervention in the choice to use IVF, as
long as that choice itself does not harm anyone.50 Currently, there is
little government supervision of reproduction-assisting technologies,
and many proponents fear legal regulation of these new means of re-
production. In their view, financial and social barriers to IVF are un-
fortunate but inappropriate reasons to interfere with the choices of
those fortunate enough to have access to this technology. Nor, ac-
50. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 22-42.
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cording to the liberal response, does the right to use these technolo-
gies entail any government obligation to provide access to them. And
if for cultural reasons Blacks choose not to use these technologies, this
is no reason to deny them to people who have different cultural
values.
Perhaps we should not question infertile couples' motives for
wanting genetically-related children. After all, people who have chil-
dren the old-fashioned way may also practice a form of genetic selec-
tion when they choose a mate. The desire to share genetic traits with
our children may not reflect the eugenic notion that these particular
traits are superior to others; rather, as Barbara Berg notes, "these
characteristics may simply symbolize to the parents the child's connec-
tion to past generations and the ability to extend that lineage forward
into the future."51 Several people have responded to my concerns
about race by explaining to me, "White couples want white children
not because of any belief in racial superiority, but because they want
children who are like them."
Moreover, the danger of government scrutiny of people's motives
for their reproductive decisions may override my concerns about ra-
cism. This danger leads some feminists who oppose the practice of
using abortion as a sex selection technique, for example, nevertheless
to oppose its legal prohibition.52 As Tabitha Powledge explained:
To forbid women to use prenatal diagnostic techniques as a way of
picking the sexes of their babies is to begin to delineate acceptable
and unacceptable reasons to have an abortion .... I hate these
technologies, but I do not want to see them legally regulated be-
cause, quite simply, I do not want to provide an opening wedge for
legal regulation of reproduction in general.53
It would be similarly unwise to permit the government to question
individuals' reasons for deciding to use reproduction-assisting
technologies.
B. The Distributive Solution
The distributive solution does not question individuals' motives in
order to question the societal impact of a practice.54 This approach to
51. Barbara J. Berg, Listening to the Voices of the Infertile, in REPRODUCrION, ETH-
ics, AND THE LAW: FEmImST PERSPECrTVES, supra note 11, at 80, 82.
52. Joan C. Callahan, Introduction, Part I: Prenatal and Postnatal Authority to RE-
PRODUCTION, ETics, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECIVES, supra note 11, at 133-134.
53. Tabitha M. Powledge, Unnatural Selection: On Choosing Children's Sex, in TE
CUSTOM-MAIDE CM?: WOMEN-CENTERED PERSPECTIVES 193,197 (Helen B. Holmes et
al. eds., 1981).
54. See Overall, supra note 44, at 17-39.
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procreative liberty places more importance on reproduction's social
context than does the liberal focus on the fulfillment of individual
desires.5 5 Policies governing reproduction not only affect an individ-
ual's personal identity; they also shape the way we value each other
and interpret social problems. The social harm that stems from con-
fining the new reproduction largely to the hands of wealthy white
couples might be a reason to demand equalized access to these
technologies.
Obviously the unequal distribution of wealth in our society pre-
vents the less well off from buying countless goods and services that
wealthy people can afford. But there may be a reason why we should
be especially concerned about this disparity when it applies to
reproduction.
Reproduction is special. Government policy concerning repro-
duction has tremendous power to affect the status of entire groups of
people. This is why the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma de-
clared the right to bear children to be "one of the basic civil rights of
man. '56 "In evil or reckless hands," Justice Douglas wrote, the gov-
ernment's power to sterilize "can cause races or types which are inimi-
cal to the dominant group to wither and disappear. '57 This explains
why in the Casey opinion Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
stressed the importance the right to an abortion had for women's
equal social status. It is precisely the connection between reproduc-
tion and human dignity that makes a system of procreative liberty that
privileges the wealthy and powerful particularly disturbing.
Procreative liberty's importance to human dignity is a compelling
reason to guarantee the equal distribution of procreative resources in
society. Moreover, the power of unequal access to these resources to
entrench unjust social hierarchies is just as pernicious as government
interference in wealthy individuals' expensive procreative choices.
We might therefore address the racial disparity in the use of reproduc-
tive technologies by ensuring through public spending that their use is
not concentrated among affluent white people. Government subsi-
dies, such as Medicaid coverage of IVF, and legislation mandating pri-
55. For a more extended critique of the liberal approach to reproduction-assisting
technologies, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice, Procreative Liberty, and the Limits of
Liberal Theory: Robertson's Children of Choice, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 601 (1995); Joan C.
Callahan & Dorothy E. Roberts, A Feminist Social Justice Approach to Reproduction-As-
sisting Technologies: A Case Study on the Limits of Liberal Theory, - Ky. L. REv.
(forthcoming 1996).
56. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
57. Id.
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vate insurance coverage of IVF would allow more diverse and
widespread enjoyment of the new reproduction.
C. Should We Discourage the New Reproduction?
If these technologies are in some ways positively harmful, will ex-
panding their distribution in society solve the problem? The racial
critique of the new reproduction is more unsettling than just its expo-
sure of the maldistribution of fertility services. It also challenges the
importance that we place on genetics and genetic ties.
But can we limit individuals' access to these technologies without
critically trampling our protection of individual freedom from unwar-
ranted government intrusion? After all, governments have perpe-
trated as much injustice on the theory that individual interests must be
sacrificed for the public good as they have on the theory that equality
must be sacrificed for individual liberty. This was the rationale justify-
ing eugenic sterilization laws enacted earlier in this century.58
Even for liberals, individuals' freedom to use reproductive tech-
nologies is not absolute. Most liberals would place some limit on their
use, perhaps by defining the legitimate reasons for procreation. 59 If a
core view of reproduction can limit individuals' personal procreative
decisions, then why not consider a view that takes into account repro-
duction's role in social arrangements of wealth and power? If the
harm to an individual child or even to a core notion of procreation can
justify barring her parents from using the technique of their choice,
then why not the new reproduction's potential for worsening group
inequality?
Some have concluded that the harms caused by certain reproduc-
tion-assisting practices justify their prohibition. In 1985, for example,
the United Kingdom passed the Surrogacy Arrangements Act ban-
ning commercial contract pregnancy arrangements and imposing fines
and/or imprisonment on the brokers who negotiate these agree-
ments.60 Some Marxist and radical feminists agree that paid preg-
58. See Mark H. Hailer, Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought
(1963).
59. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 2, at 167 (positing "a core view of the goals and
values of reproduction" that limits an individual's right to shape offspring characteristics).
60. Rosemarie Tong, Feminist Perspectives on Gestational Motherhood. The Search
for a Unified Focus, in REPRODUCrION, ETH-cs, AND THE LAW: FEMImST PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 11, at 55,58 (citing Surrogacy Arrangements Act, 1985, United Kingdom, Chap-
ter 49, p.2 (1)(a)(b)(e)).
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nancy contracts should be criminalized to prevent their exploitation
and commodification of women and children.61
On the other hand, the government need not depart at all from
the liberal noninterference model of rights in order to discourage or
refuse to support practices that contribute to social injustice.62 Even
the negative view of liberty that protects procreative choice from gov-
ernment intrusion leaves the state free to decide not to lend assistance
to the fertility business or its clients.
We may therefore question a practice that channels millions of
dollars into the fertility business, rather than spending similar
amounts on programs that would provide more extensive benefits to
infertile people. New York Times writer Trip Gabriel describes IVE
clinics as "[a] virtually free-market branch of medicine, the $350 mil-
lion-a-year business has been largely exempt from government regula-
tion and from the downward pressure on costs that insurance
companies exert."'63
Indeed, we can no longer avoid these concerns about the social
costs and benefits of IVF. Such calculations are now part of the de-
bate surrounding the advisability of state laws requiring insurance
companies to include the cost of fertility treatment in their coverage.
A study recently reported in the New England Journal of Medicine
calculated the real cost of IVF at approximately $67,000 to $114,000
per successful delivery.64 The authors concluded that the debate
about insurance coverage must take into account these economic im-
plications of IVF, as well as ethical and social judgments about re-
source allocation. 65
Black women in particular would be better served by a focus on
the basic improvement of conditions that lead to infertility, such as
occupational and environmental hazards, diseases, and complications
following childbirth and abortion. 66
61. Id. at 64-68.
62. Callahan & Roberts, supra note 55.
63. Gabriel, supra note 20, at 10.
64. Peter J. Neuman et al., The Cost of a Successful Delivery with In Vitro Fertiliza-
tion, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 239, 239 (1994). Unlike the $8,000 cost per IVF cycle men-
tioned above, the figures quoted in this study refer to the cost involved in the birth of at
least one live baby as a result of an IVF cycle.
65. Id.
66. See Nadine Taub, Surrogacy: A Preferred Treatment for Infertility?, 16 L. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 89 (1988).
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Taking these social justice concerns more seriously, then, might
justify government efforts to reallocate resources away from expen-
sive reproductive technologies.
Conclusion
These are thorny questions. It is extremely difficult to untangle
white couples' reasons for using reproduction-assisting technologies
and Black couples' reasons for avoiding them. Evidence is hard to
come by: what doctor or fertility clinic will admit (at least publicly) to
steering Black women away from their services? Few people seem to
want to confront the obvious complexion of this field. Moreover, the
problems raised by the racial disparity in the use of these technologies
will not be solved merely by attempting to expand their distribution.
Indeed, the concerns I have raised in this essay may be best addressed
by placing restrictions on the use and development of the technolo-
gies, restrictions imposed by the government or encouraged by moral
persuasion. This possibility is met by a legitimate concern about pro-
tection of our private decisions from government scrutiny. Indeed,
Black women are most vulnerable to government efforts to control
their reproductive lives.
Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the negative impact that the racial
disparity and imagery of the new reproduction can have on racial ine-
quality in America. Our vision of procreative liberty must include the
eradication of group oppression, and not just a concern for protecting
the reproductive choices of the most privileged. It must also include
alternative conceptions of the family and the significance of genetic
relatedness that truly challenge the dominant meaning of family.
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